Suspects of DWI/DUI in New Jersey are entitled to Miranda Rights During DWI Interrogation. However, there is a difference between being interrogated during the initial stop of your car and once you are arrested. The Miranda Warnings ("You have a right to remain silent, etc... .) must be given to a suspect once the initial field inquiry stop escalates to a detention-- where the suspect obviously is not free to leave the area. Once the suspect is detained/arrested, he should be given his Miranda Warnings. These warnings are designed to protect suspects from incriminating themselves while under arrest. You have no such protection when the officer pulls you over and asks for your license and registration. Once you are taken back to police headquarters, however, Miranda Warnings are routinely given before interrogation. Typically, before you are asked to submit breath samples, a police officer will read the Miranda Warnings from a form on which you place your initials indicating that each warning was read and understood by you. If you were never read or given your Miranda rights during your DWI/DUI arrest, your case will not automatically be dismissed on a technicality. You may still be tried and possibly convicted. However, any statements you made that resulted from the violation of your Miranda rights may be suppressed (excluded) by the judge from the trial.

The Miranda warning (also referred to as Miranda rights) is a warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial interrogation) before they are interrogated to inform them about their constitutional rights. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of the United States held that an elicited incriminating statement by a suspect will not constitute admissible evidence unless the suspect was informed of the right to decline to make self-incriminatory statements and the right to legal counsel (hence the so-called "Miranda rights"), and makes a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights. The Miranda warning is not a condition of detention, but rather a safeguard against self-incrimination; as a result, if law enforcement officials decline to offer a Miranda warning to an individual in their custody, they may still interrogate that person and act upon the knowledge gained, but may not use that person's statements to incriminate him or her in a criminal trial.

Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins suspects retain their 5th Amendment right to remain silent, however, if a suspect waives this right and interrogation begins, the right to halt further interrogation by the police must be exercised explicitly, by revoking the prior waiver of this 5th Amendment right.

The concept of "Miranda rights" was enshrined in U.S. law following the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona Supreme Court decision, which found that the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights of Ernesto Arturo Miranda had been violated during his arrest and trial for rape and kidnapping (Miranda was subsequently retried and convicted).

The Supreme Court did not specify the exact wording to use when informing a suspect of their rights. However, the Court did create a set of guidelines that must be followed. The ruling states:

...The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he or she has the right to remain silent, and that anything the person says will be used against that person in court; the person must be clearly informed that he or she has the right to consult with an attorney and to have that attorney present during questioning, and that, if he or she is indigent, an attorney will be provided at no cost to represent her or him.

As a result, American English developed the verb Mirandize, meaning "read the Miranda warning to" a suspect (when the suspect is arrested).

Notably, the Miranda rights do not have to be read in any particular order, and they do not have to precisely match the language of the Miranda decision, as long as they are adequately and fully conveyed. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).

On June 1, 2010, in deciding the Berghuis v. Thompkins case, the United States Supreme Court declared that criminal defendants who have been read the Miranda rights (and who have indicated they understand them and have not already waived them), must explicitly state during or before an interrogation begins that they wish to be silent and not speak to police in order for that protection against self-incrimination to apply. If they speak to police about the incident before invoking the Miranda right to remain silent, or afterwards at any point during the interrogation or detention, the words they speak may be used against them if they have not stated they do not want to speak to police. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas and by Chief Justice Roberts. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer dissented. Elena Kagan, who had presented the government's case as Solicitor General of the U.S. and who was nominated to succeed Justice Stevens, supported Kennedy's ruling in her arguments that pointed out that the ruling spelled out for prosecutors and defendants just how the right against self-incrimination applies in such cases. Those who oppose it state that the requirement that the defendant must speak to indicate his intention to remain silent further erodes the ability of the defendant to stay completely silent about the case. This opposition must be put in context with the second option offered by the majority opinion, which allowed that the defendant had the option of remaining silent, saying: " Had he wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation." Thus having been "Mirandized" a suspect may avow explicitly the invocation of these rights, or, alternatively, simply remain silent. Absent the former "anything [said] can and will be used against [the defendant] in a court of law."

Because Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations, it does not protect detainees from standard booking questions such as name and address. Because it is a protective measure intended to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, it does not prevent the police from taking blood without a warrant from persons suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. (Such evidence may be self-incriminatory, but is not considered a statement of self-incrimination.)