"Under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution, judicially-authorized search warrants are strongly preferred before law enforcement officers conduct a search, particularly of a home." State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008). "Therefore, when the police act without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence not only that the search or seizure was premised on probable cause, but also that it 'f[ell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)) (alteration in original). "Those exceptions are based on the recognition that under certain exigent circumstances a search without a warrant is both reasonable and necessary." State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160, L. Ed.2d 128 (2004).
Our courts have "adopted a three-prong test to determine whether a warrantless search by a public safety official is justified under the emergency aid doctrine." Id. at 600.
Under that test, the public safety official must have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency requires that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or prevent serious injury; his primary motivation for entry into the home must be to render assistance, not to find and seize evidence; and there must be a reasonable nexus between the emergency and the area or places to be searched.
[Ibid. (citing State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 161 (2004)).]
In applying this test, the court must "avoid viewing the events through the distorted prism of hindsight, recognizing that those who must act in the heat of the moment do so without the luxury of time for calm reflection or sustained deliberation." Id. at 599.
Here, the trial court found that all three prongs of the Frankel test had been satisfied. In its written opinion dated December 17, 2008, the court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that defendant had been injured in the accident and required immediate medical assistance. The court additionally found that the officer's primary motivation for entering into defendant's home without a warrant was to render assistance, not to find and seize evidence. In addition, the court found that there was a reasonable nexus between the emergency and the areas of the home where the officers went.
The court's factual findings are binding upon us because they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Deference to the court's factual findings is particularly appropriate in this case because the court's findings were informed by its "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Id. at 471 (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161-62).
Defendant argues, however, that there was insufficient evidence to justify the officers' entry into her home. She contends that, while the officers stated that they saw a "stain" on the wall, there was no evidence as to whether the "stain" was blood, was old or new, or had some relationship to the auto accident. Defendant asserts that Williams' description of the stain as a "red smudge" suggests that "the spot was fairly small and insignificant."
We find no merit in these contentions. Suffice it to say, in light of the information the officers had concerning the accident, they reasonably believed that the "stain" on the wall in defendant's home was blood and defendant might require immediate medical assistance. The officers were not required to undertake a forensic analysis of the "stain" before entering defendant's home. Moreover, the State was not required to present proof that the "stain" was, in fact, blood in order to establish that the officers had a reasonable belief that defendant required immediate medical assistance.
Defendant further argues that the officers' entry into her home was primarily motivated by a desire to obtain evidence concerning the accident, rather than to provide emergency assistance. Again, we disagree. As the trial court pointed out in its written opinion, there is no evidence to suggest that the officers were primarily motivated by a desire to obtain evidence concerning the accident.
The record supports the court's finding. When the officers entered the home, they went to the bedroom, asked defendant whether she required an ambulance and checked her injuries. Defendant's assertion that the officers' "real motivation" was to arrest her and collect evidence that she had been DWI is without merit.
Defendant additionally relies upon Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed.2d 732 (1984), in support of her contention that warrantless entry into her home was not justified due to exigent circumstances. In Welsh, the defendant swerved his car off the road but did not damage any person or property and walked home. Id. at 742, 104 S. Ct. at 2093-94, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 738. The police entered the defendant's home without a warrant and arrested him for driving while under the influence. Id. at 743, 104 S. Ct. at 2094, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 738-39.
In Welsh, the Court held that the officer's warantless entry into the home was not justified. Id. at 754-55, 104 S. Ct. at 2100, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 746. The Court noted that the underlying offense was a civil, rather than criminal, offense with no imprisonment. Id. at 754, 104 S. Ct. at 2100, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 746. The Court stated that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed." Id. at 753, 104 S. Ct. at 2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 745.
We are satisfied that defendant's reliance upon Welsh is misplaced. The defendant in Welsh was not injured and the Court did not consider whether the officer's entry into the defendant's home was justified by the need to provide the defendant with emergency medical assistance.
III.
Next, defendant argues that she was unlawfully arrested inside of her home and she did not voluntarily agree to accompany the officers back to the scene of the accident. The contention is without merit.
"The test for determining whether [a] defendant was arrested is that of the objective reasonable person. That is, considering all of the surrounding circumstances, would a reasonable person conclude that he is not free to leave." State v. Craig, 237 N.J. Super. 407, 412 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 6 62 (1990).
Here, the trial court noted that Strumalo had testified that he asked defendant if she would accompany him back to the accident scene, and she voluntarily agreed to do so. The court noted that defendant was not in handcuffs and never told the officers that she did not want to go with them. The court pointed out that both Strumalo and Williams stated that they went to defendant's home to assist in the investigation and neither officer stated that they went to defendant's home to arrest her.
The court also observed that, while Vanderclock had written in his report that Strumalo said he had detained defendant and was bringing her back to the accident scene, Strumalo had credibly testified that he did not detain defendant or so inform Vanderclock. In its written opinion, the court stated:
There is no evidence that the defendant felt restricted or restrained by the police officers when she consented to accompany them back to her vehicle. There is also nothing showing that the police conveyed any behavior that would make the defendant feel like she [did not] have a choice but to comply. Even though Officer Vanderclock testified that he felt the defendant was detained and would not have let her go once she was at the scene, the officers who did respond to her residence and asked her to come back to the scene, did not testify as to that fact.
We are satisfied the court's findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 470-71. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that she was unlawfully arrested in her home.
IV.
Defendant additionally argues that trial court erred by holding that the officers were not required to advise her of her right to refuse to accompany them back to the accident scene. Again, we disagree.
Here, the trial court noted that generally the State must show the occupant of premises was informed of his or her right to refuse a request by the police for consent to search the premises. The court found that such advice was not required in this case because the officers did not seek defendant's consent to search her home. The officers merely asked defendant to accompany them back to the accident scene so that they could continue their investigation.
The court's decision was correct. See State v. Padilla, 321 N.J. Super. 96, 108 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd o.b., 163 N.J. 3 (2000) (holding that police were not required to inform occupant of her right to refuse consent when they sought permission to enter premises to continue their investigation rather than to conduct a search).
We have considered defendant's other contentions and find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
